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The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising
￿eld of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment ag-
gregation rules, each of which protects against a speci￿c type of manipulation by agenda
setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions
are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the
main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions argu-
ably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting
independence to "premises", which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This pro-
cedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent. JEL Classi￿cation
Numbers: D70, D71, D79.
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1 Introduction
While the more traditional discipline in social choice theory, preference aggregation, aims to
merge individual preference orderings over a set of alternatives, judgment aggregation aims
to merge individual (yes/no-)judgments over a set of interrelated propositions (expressed
in formal logic). Suppose for instance that a cabinet has to reach a judgment about the
following three propositions.
a : "we can a⁄ord a budget de￿cit";
b : "spending on education should be raised";
a ! b : "if we can a⁄ord a budget de￿cit then spending on education should be raised".
a a ! b b
Camp 1 Yes Yes Yes
Camp 2 Yes No No
Camp 3 No Yes No
Majority Yes Yes No
Table 1: Collective inconsistency under majority voting
1I wish to thank Luc Bovens, Christian List, Jocelyn Paine, Marc Pauly and Martin van Hees, for very
inspiring discussions. I am also grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Federal Ministry of
Education and Research, and the Program for the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government,
for supporting this research. I have presented this paper at the workshop Judgment Aggregation and the
Discursive Dilemma (University of Konstanz, June 2004).The cabinet is split into three camps of equal size. As indicated in Table 1, ministers
of the ￿rst camp accept all three propositions. The two other camps both reject b; but
disagree on the reason for rejecting b: the second camp accepts a but rejects the implication
a ! b; and the third camp accepts the implication a ! b but rejects a: So, although a 2/3
majority of the ministers rejects b; 2/3 majorities accept each premise a and a ! b. Should
the cabinet reject b (conclusion-based voting) or rather accept b on the grounds of accepting
both premises of b (premise-based voting)?
Such collective inconsistencies arise not just for the particular rule of propositionwise
majority voting, and not just for the mentioned agenda. List and Pettit [7,8] prove a ￿rst
formal impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation, recently complemented by Pauly and
van Hees￿[9] powerful results. List [4,5,6] and Bovens and Rabinowicz [1] derive possibility
results. For discussions of judgment aggregation, e.g. Brennan [2] and Chapman [3].
At the heart of the existing impossibility theorems is the requirement of propositionwise
aggregation or independence, an analogue of Arrow￿ s independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Is it justi￿ed to impose independence on a judgment aggregation rule? I ￿rst introduce a
family of new independence conditions, and show that each of them protects against a par-
ticular type of manipulation. Second, I prove impossibility theorems for these independence
conditions. One novelty is that the main impossibility theorem applies to all (non-trivial)
agendas, and hence to a wide range of real situations. Finally, to make premise-based collect-
ive decision-making possible, I suggest restricting the independence requirement to a set of
"premises", and prove a characterisation theorem for the so-called premise-based procedure.
2 The basic model
Let there be a group of individuals, labelled 1; 2; :::; n (n ￿ 2), having to make collective
judgments on a set of propositions X; the agenda. Speci￿cally, consider a set of propositional
symbols a;b;c;::: (representing non-decomposable sentences such as a and b in the above
example), and de￿ne the set of all propositions, L, as the (smallest) set such that
￿ L contains all propositional symbols, called atomic propositions;
￿ if L contains p and q, then L also contains :p (￿not p￿ ), (p ^ q) (￿p and q￿ ), (p _ q)
(￿p or q￿ ), (p ! q) (￿p implies q￿ ) and (p $ q) (￿p if and only if q￿ ).
For ease of notation, I drop the external ()-brackets around propositions, e.g. I write
a ^ (b ! c) for (a ^ (b ! c)): A truth-value assignment is a function assigning the value
￿true￿or ￿false￿to each proposition in L, with the standard consistency properties.2 A set
A ￿ L is (logically) consistent/inconsistent if there exists a/no truth-value assignment that
assigns "true" to each p 2 A. Finally, for A ￿ L and p 2 L, A (logically) entails p; written
A ￿ p; if A [ f:pg is inconsistent.
Now, the agenda X is a non-empty subset of L, where by assumption X contains no
double-negated propositions (::p), and X consists of proposition-negation pairs in the fol-
lowing sense: if p 2 X, then also ￿ p 2 X, where
￿ p :=
￿
:p if p is not itself a negated proposition,
q if p is the negated proposition :q:
2Speci￿cally, for any p;q 2 L, :p is true if and only if p is false; p ^ q is true if and only if both p and q
are true; p _ q is true if and only if p or q is true; p ! q is true if and only if q is true or p is false; p $ q is
true if and only if p and q are both true or both false.
2The example had X = fa;b;a ! b;negationsg ("negations" stands for ":a;:b;:(a ! b)").
A judgment set (held by an individual or the collective) is a subset A ￿ X, where p 2 A
means ￿acceptance of proposition p￿ . I consider two rationality conditions on judgment
sets A: consistency (see above) and completeness (i.e., for every p 2 X, p 2 A or ￿ p 2 A).
(Together they imply List￿ s "deductive closure" condition.) For instance, for the above
agenda, the judgment set A = ; is consistent but incomplete, the judgment set A = fa;a !
b;:bg is complete but inconsistent, and the judgment set A = fa;a ! b;bg is consistent and
complete. Let A be the set of all consistent and complete judgment sets.
A pro￿le is an n-tuple (A1;:::;An) of (individual) judgment sets. A (judgment) ag-
gregation rule is a function, F; that assigns to each pro￿le (A1;:::;An) (in some set of ad-
missible pro￿les called the domain of F and written Dom(F)) a (collective) judgment set
F(A1;:::;An) = A ￿ X. For instance, propositionwise majority voting (with universal do-
main An) is the aggregation rule F such that, for each pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 An, F(A1;:::;An)
contains each proposition p 2 X if and only if more individuals i have p 2 Ai than p = 2 Ai;
as seen above, F(A1;:::;An) may then be inconsistent, hence not in A.
3 Collective judgments are sensitive to the agenda choice:
examples of agenda manipulation
Collective judgments are highly sensitive to reformulations of the agenda, as some examples
will demonstrate. An "agenda manipulation" is the modi￿cation of the agenda by the agenda
setter in order to a⁄ect the collective judgments on certain propositions.
The sensitivity to the agenda choice. Consider again the above cabinet of ministers
split into three camps, where a is "we can a⁄ord a budget de￿cit" and b is "spending on
education should be raised". Many di⁄erent speci￿cations of the agenda X are imaginable.
Assuming that the collective judgment set A is formed by propositionwise majority voting,
(a) the agenda X = fa;b;negationsg leads to A = fa;:bg,
(b) the agenda X = fa;a ! b;negationsg leads to A = fa;a ! bg;
(c) the agenda X = fa;a ! b;b;negationsg leads to A = fa;a ! b;:bg (collective
inconsistency).
While in (a) the collective judgment set contains b; in (b) it logically entails :b; and in
(c) it is inconsistent.
General agenda manipulation. Assume the original (non-manipulated) agenda is that
in (a). An agenda setter who thinks spending on education should be raised can reverse the
rejection of b by using the agenda in (b) instead.
Logical agenda manipulation. Note that the manipulated agenda in (b) need not settle
b: it may lead to a collective judgment set of f:a;a ! bg; which entails neither b nor :b,
hence entails no decision about spending on education. The agenda setter may not have the
power to manipulate the agenda to the extent of possibly not settling b. Then he can achieve
acceptance of b by using the agenda X￿ = fa;a $ b;negationsg, which settles b whatever
the (complete and consistent) collective judgment set. Formally, I say that b belongs to the
scope of X￿.
3De￿nition 1 A set A ￿ L "settles" a proposition p 2 L if A ￿ p or A ￿ :p: The "scope"
or "extended agenda" of an agenda X is the set X of propositions p 2 L settled by each
(consistent and complete) judgment set A 2 A.
For instance, the scope of X = fa;b;negationsg contains the propositions b;a_b;a ! (:b);
etc. In general, how much larger than X is X? The scope X is the (in￿nite) set of all
(arbitrarily complex) propositions constructible from propositions X using logical operations
(:;^;_;!;$), as well as all propositions logically equivalent to such propositions.
I call an agenda manipulation of X ￿ L into X￿ ￿ L logical if it preserves the scope, i.e.
if X = X￿, or equivalently X ￿ X￿ and X￿ ￿ X. Logical agenda manipulation, which has
a wide range of examples3, might appear to be a mild form of manipulation, as it merely
frames the same decision problem in di⁄erent logical terms: X and X￿ are equivalent in that
any (complete and consistent) judgment set for X entails one for X￿; and vice versa. Yet X
and X￿ may reverse collective judgments on certain propositions, as demonstrated above.
4 Independence conditions to prevent manipulation by agenda
setters and voters
Di⁄erent independence conditions, all of the following general form, may each prevent a
speci￿c type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. Consider any subset Y ￿ X.
Independence on Y (IY ). For every proposition p 2 Y and every two pro￿les (A1;:::;An);
(A0
1;:::;A0
n) 2 Dom(F), if [for every person i, Ai ￿ p if and only if A0
i ￿ p] then [F(A1;:::;An) ￿
p if and only if F(A0
1;:::;A0
n) ￿ p].
Here, I interpret "Ai ￿ p" and "F(A1;:::;An) ￿ p" as "acceptance of p", even when this
acceptance is not expressed explicitly (i.e. no "3 p") but only entailed logically. Note that
A ￿ p is equivalent to p 2 A if p 2 X and A 2 A. If Y ￿ Y ￿ (￿ X), then (IY ￿) implies (IY ).
Condition (IY ) prescribes propositionwise aggregation for each proposition in Y . To make
this precise, following Pauly and van Hees [9] I de￿ne a (propositionwise) decision method as a
mapping M : f0;1gn ! f0;1g; taking vectors (t1;:::;tn) of (individual) truth values to single
(collective) truth values M(t1;:::;tn) (where 0/1 stands for rejection/acceptance of a given
proposition). For instance, the absolute majority method M is de￿ned by [M(t1;:::;tn) = 1
if and only if t1 +:::+tn > n=2], and the unanimity method by [M(t1;:::;tn) = 1 if and only
if t1 = ::: = tn = 1]: I say that F "applies decision method M for p" if, for every pro￿le
(A1;:::;An) 2 Dom(F), we have t = M(t1;:::;tn); where t1;:::;tn and t are the individual
and collective truth values of p (i.e., ti is 1 if Ai ￿ p and 0 else, and t is 1 if F(A1;:::;An) ￿ p
and 0 else). The following characterisation of (IY ) is obvious.
Proposition 1 Let Y ￿ X. Then F is independent on Y (IY ) if and only if, for each
proposition p 2 Y; F applies some decision method Mp for p.
3For instance: (1) adding or removing propositions settled by the other propositions, e.g. modifying
fa;b;negationsg into fa;b;a^b;negationsg; or vice versa; (2) replacing a proposition by one logically equivalent
to it or to its negation, unconditionally or given judgments on the other proposition(s), e.g. modifying
fa;b;negationsg into fa;b $ a,negationsg; (3) replacing X by its set of (possibly negated) "states of the world"
f^p2Ap;:^p2ApjA 2 Ag; e.g. modifying fa;b;negationsg into fa^b;(:a)^b;a^(:b);(:a)^(:b);negationsg.
4Preventing agenda manipulation. Consider the following special cases of (IY ).
De￿nition 2 Independence on Y (IY ) is called "independence" if Y = X; "strong independ-
ence" if Y = X; and "independence on states of the world" if Y = e X := f^p2Ap : A 2 Ag:
Independence (IX) is equivalent to Pauly and van Hees￿independence condition if all
(individual or collective) judgment sets belong to A; as required in all present and previous
impossibility theorems.4 I call ^p2Ap (A 2 A) a state of the world since it is the conjunction
of all propositions of a complete and consistent judgment set.5 States of the world are
maximally ￿ne-grained descriptions of the world (relative to X). For instance, if the agenda
is X = fa;b;negationsg then e X = fa ^ b;(:a) ^ b;a ^ (:b);(:a) ^ (:b)g:
To state the merits of these conditions, I say that an agenda manipulation "reverses" the
decision about a proposition p if the old agenda leads to a consistent collective judgment set
entailing p and the new agenda leads to one entailing :p; or vice versa.
Claim A. By imposing independence, the decisions on propositions p 2 X cannot be reversed
by adding or removing propositions in X other than p.
Claim B. By imposing independence on states of the world, the decisions on propositions
p 2 X cannot be reversed by logical agenda manipulation.
Claim C. By imposing strong independence, the decisions on propositions p 2 X cannot be
reversed by any form of agenda manipulation.
Claim D. If F violates independence (resp. strong independence), then for some pro￿le
in Dom(F) the decision on some proposition p 2 X (resp. p 2 X) can be reversed by an
agenda manipulation of the type in claim A (resp. C).
These claims rest on the following assumptions:
(1) For any agenda, each individual i holds a consistent and complete judgment set, and
i￿ s judgment sets for two agendas are consistent with each other.
(2) For any agenda, collective judgment sets have to be consistent and complete.
(3) For any agendas X and X￿ with corresponding aggregation rules F resp. F￿ on
which (IY ) resp. (IY ￿) is imposed, and each proposition p 2 Y \ Y ￿; F and F￿ apply the
same decision method Mp for p. (Interpretation: Mp is chosen independently of the other
propositions in the agenda, e.g. Mp is prescribed by law or is "intrinsically adequate" for p).
Proof of claim A [assuming (1)-(3)]. Suppose independence is imposed. Let p 2 X and
consider a (manipulated) agenda X￿ with p 2 X: For the two agendas, by (1) the individual
truth values of p stay the same, and by (IX)/(IX￿) and (3) the decision method Mp applied
for p stays the same. Hence the collective truth value of p stays the same. ￿





if [for every person i, p 2 Ai if and only if p 2 A
0





This condition is equivalent to (IX) if all judgment sets accepted or generated by F are in A, because [p 2 A
if and only if A ￿ p] for all p 2 X and A 2 A.
5For in￿nite X, the conjunction ^p2Ap is one over an in￿nite set of propositions, hence not part of the
language, so not part of the scope X. However, as each judgment set in A settles each ^p2Ap, A 2 A, states
of the world are part of the scope formed in an extended language that allows conjunctions over in￿nite sets
of propositions of the cardinality (size) of X (e.g. countably in￿nite conjunctions if X is countably in￿nite).
So condition (I e X) may be considered even for in￿nite agendas X.
5Proof of claim B [assuming (1)-(3)]. Suppose independence on states of the world is
imposed. Let p 2 X and consider a (manipulated) agenda X￿ with X = X￿: For simplicity,
assume X and X￿ are both ￿nite (but the proof could be generalised). Then e X and f X￿
each contains, up to logical equivalence, all atoms (i.e. maximally consistent members) of
X = X￿: Let r be any atom of X = X￿: For the two agendas, by (1) the individual truth
values of r stay the same, and by (I e X)/(I f X￿) and (3) the decision method applied for r
stays the same. So the collective truth value of r stays the same. Since p is equivalent to a
disjunction of atoms r of X = X￿; the collective truth value of p follows from those of the
atoms r of X = X￿ (by using (2)). So the collective truth value of p stays the same. ￿
Proof of claim C [assuming (1)-(3) and the monotonicity condition (4) below]. Now
impose strong independence. Let p 2 X and consider any (manipulated) agenda X￿: First
let p 2 X￿: Then for both agendas, by (1) the individual truth values of p stay the same,
and by (IX)/(IX￿) and (3) the same decision method Mp is applied for p. So the collective
truth value of p stays the same. Now let p = 2 X￿: Suppose the agendas X and X￿ result in
the collective judgment sets A resp. A￿: To show that the collective judgment on p is not
reversed, it is (by (2)) su¢ cient to show that A￿ ￿ p implies A ￿ p, and A￿ ￿ :p implies
A ￿ :p. I only show the former, as the proof of the latter is analogous. So, let A￿ ￿ p:
It is plausible that decision methods are chosen as monotonic both in truth values and in
propositions:
(4) If decision method Mq is applied for q by all aggregation rules on which (IY ) is
imposed for some Y containing q, then, for ￿xed q; [ti ￿ t￿
i for all i implies Mq(t1;:::;tn) ￿
Mq(t￿
1;:::;t￿
n)], and, for ￿xed t1;:::;tn, [q￿ ￿ q implies Mq￿(t1;:::;tn) ￿ Mq(t1;:::;tn)].
Take any p￿ 2 X￿ with A￿ ￿ p￿ and p￿ ￿ p (e.g. p￿ = ^q2A￿q). For agendas X (X￿),
let Mp (Mp￿) be the decision method applied for p (p￿), and ti (t￿
i) i￿ s truth values of p
(p￿). By p￿ ￿ p and (1), we have t￿
i ￿ ti for all i. Since also p￿ ￿ p, by (4) Mp￿(t￿
1;:::;t￿
n) ￿
Mp(t1;:::t;n ). By A￿ ￿ p￿ we have Mp￿(t￿
1;:::;t￿
n) = 1; so Mp(t1;:::;tn) = 1; so A ￿ p. ￿
Proof of claim D. [assuming (1),(2)]. Suppose F violates (IX) (the proof for (IX) is
analogous). So there are two pro￿les in Dom(F) with identical individual but opposed
collective judgments about some p 2 X. So, using the agenda X￿ := fp;￿ pg instead of X
reverses the collective judgment for one of the two mentioned pro￿les. ￿
Preventing manipulation by voters. Assume that it is desirable that no person i can,
by submitting a false judgment set, reverse in his/her favour the collective judgment about
any given proposition in Y (￿ X). Generalising Dietrich and List￿ s6 de￿nition of "strategy-
proofness on Y " to subsets Y ￿ X (rather than Y ￿ X), 7 one may easily prove a result
analogous to their Theorem 1:
￿ If F is independent on Y and monotonic on Y then F is strategy-proof on Y; and the
converse implication also holds in case F has universal domain.
(Monotonicity on Y and universal domain are de￿ned below). So, independence on Y
(IY ) is crucial for strategy-proofness on Y : (IY ) is together with monotonicity on Y su¢ cient,
and under universal domain also necessary for strategy-proofness on Y .
6F. Dietrich and C. List, Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation, unpublished paper, Konstanz Univ., 2004.
7More precisely, I call F strategy-proof on Y (￿ X) if, for every person i, pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Dom(F)
and proposition p 2 Y , if Ai disagrees with F(A1;:::;An) on p (i.e. Ai ￿ p if and only if F(A1;:::;An) 2 p),
then Ai still disagrees with F(A1;:::;A
￿
i;:::;An) on p for every i-variant (A1;:::;A
￿
i;:::; An) 2 Dom(F).
A game-theoretic justi￿cation for this de￿nition may be given along the lines of Dietrich and List￿ s analysis.
65 Impossibility theorems for judgment aggregation
I now prove that each independence condition is incompatible with seemingly minimal re-
quirements on F: However, the impossibility for independence (IX) holds only for special
agendas.
First, individual judgments are left unrestricted subject to the rationality constraint of
consistency and completeness, and collective judgments have to be equally rational:
Universal Domain (U). The domain of F, Dom(F), is the set An = A ￿ ::: ￿ A of all
logically possible pro￿les of complete and consistent individual judgment sets.
Collective Rationality (C). For any pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Dom(F), F(A1;:::;An) 2 A.
Recently inspired by Pauly and van Hees￿[9] ￿ndings, I realised that a unanimity principle
(as in Arrow￿ s Theorem) is not necessary for my theorem; I can replace it by:
Weak Responsiveness (R). There exist two pro￿les (A1;:::;An);(A0
1;:::;A0
n) 2 Dom(F)
such that F(A1;:::;An) 6= F(A0
1;:::;A0
n):
Propositions p;q are "in trivial dependence" if p is logically equivalent to q or to :q; or p or
q is a tautology or a contradiction. An aggregation rule F with universal domain is dictatorial
if for some person j (a "dictator") F(A1;:::;An) = Aj for all pro￿les (A1;:::;An) 2 An:
Theorem 1 If X contains at least two propositions (not in trivial dependence), then an
aggregation rule F is independent on states of the world and weakly responsive (and satis￿es
universal domain and collective rationality) if and only if F is dictatorial.
As strong independence implies independence on states of the world, we have:
Corollary 1 If X contains at least two propositions (not in trivial dependence), then an
aggregation rule F is strongly independent and weakly responsive (and satis￿es universal
domain and collective rationality) if and only if F is dictatorial.
So, for non-trivial agendas, every aggregation rule must of necessity either be dictatorial,
or be vulnerable to manipulation (see Section 4), or always generate the same judgment set,
or sometimes generate no or an inconsistent or incomplete judgment set.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on three lemmata, to be proven ￿rst.
Lemma 1 Assume (U) and (C). Then (I e X) holds if and only if, for every A 2 A and
(A1;:::;An);(A0
1;:::;A0
n) 2 Dom(F); if [for every person i; Ai = A if and only if A0
i = A]
then [F(A1;:::;An) = A if and only if F(A0
1;:::;A0
n) = A].
Proof. Obvious, as a judgment set in A entails ^p2Ap (2 e X) just in case it equals A: ￿
Judgment-Set Monotonicity (JM). For any person j and any j-variants (A1;:::;A;:::;An);
(A1;:::;A0;:::;An) 2 Dom(F), if F(A1;:::;A;:::;An) = A0 then F(A1;:::;A0;:::;An) = A0:
Lemma 2 Let X contain at least two propositions (not in trivial dependence). If F satis￿es
(U), (C) and (I e X), then F satis￿es (JM).
7Proof. Let X be as speci￿ed, and suppose (U), (C) and (I e X). To show (JM), let j be
a person and (:::;A;:::);(:::;A0;:::) 2 Dom(F) be j-variants, where ":::" denotes the other
persons￿votes. Assume for contradiction that F(:::;A;:::) = A0 but F(:::;A0;:::) 6= A0: In
(:::;A;:::) and (:::;A0;:::) exactly the same persons endorse each A00 2 AnfA;A0g; hence, as
F(:::;A;:::) 6= A00; we have F(:::;A0;:::) 6= A00 by Lemma 1; so F(:::;A0;:::) 2 fA;A0g; hence
F(:::;A0;:::) = A. By jAj ￿ 3 there exists an A00 2 AnfA;A0g. Consider the new j-variant
(:::;A00;:::). I apply twice Lemma 1, with contradictory implications: as F(:::;A;:::) = A0
and as in (:::;A;:::) and (:::;A00;:::) exactly the same persons endorse A0 (in neither pro￿le
person j), F(:::;A00;:::) = A0; but, as F(:::;A0;:::) = A and as in (:::;A0;:::) and (:::;A00;:::);
exactly the same persons endorse A (in neither pro￿le person j), F(:::;A00;:::) = A. ￿
Judgment-Set Unanimity Principle (JUP). F(A;:::;A) = A for all (A;:::;A) 2 Dom(F).
Lemma 3 Let X contain at least two propositions (not in trivial dependence). If F satis￿es
(U), (C), (I e X) and (R), then F satis￿es (JUP).
Proof. Let X be as speci￿ed, and assume (U), (C), (I e X) and (R). To show (JUP), consider
any A 2 A, and suppose for contradiction that F(A;:::;A) 6= A: I show that F(A0
1;:::;A0
n) =
F(A;:::;A) for all (A0
1;:::;A0
n) 2 An; violating (R). Take any (A0
1;:::;A0
n) 2 An and write
A0 := F(A0
1;:::;A0
n): By (JM) (see Lemma 2), if the votes A0
1;:::;A0
n are replaced one by one by
A0, the decision remains A0; and so F(A0;:::;A0) = A0: In (A0;:::;A0) and (A;:::;A) exactly the
same persons (namely nobody) endorse each A00 2 AnfA;A0g; hence, as F(A0;:::;A0) 6= A00;
we have F(A;:::;A) 6= A00 (see Lemma 1). So F(A;:::;A) 2 fA;A0g. As F(A;:::;A) 6= A; we
have F(A;:::;A) = A0; i.e. F(A;:::;A) = F(A0
1;:::;A0
n); as claimed. ￿
Proof of Theorem 1. Let X be as speci￿ed. If F is dictatorial then F obviously satis￿es
all of (U), (C), (I e X) and (R). Now I assume (U), (C), (I e X) and (R), and show that there is
a dictator. By Lemmata 2 and 3 we have (JM) and (JUP).
1. A simple algorithm. As jXj ￿ 3; there exist three distinct A;A0;A00 2 A. By (JUP),
F(A;:::;A) = A. Modify (A;:::;A) step by step as follows. Starting with person i = 1; (i)
substitute i￿ s vote A by A0: If the collective outcome is not anymore A, stop here. Otherwise,
(ii) substitute i￿ s vote A0 by A00; which by Lemma 1 leaves the outcome again at A, and do
the same substitution procedure with person i + 1 (unless i = n). There exists a person j
for whom the vote substitution in (i) alters the outcome (thus terminating the algorithm),
since otherwise one would end up with F(A00;:::;A00) = A; violating (JUP).
2. j is a dictator for A0: I write pro￿les by underlining j￿ s vote. In the pro￿les be-
fore and after replacing j￿ s vote, (A00;:::;A00;A;A;:::;A) and (A00;:::;A00;A0;A;:::;A), exactly
the same persons endorse each A￿ 2 AnfA;A0g; hence, as F(A00;:::;A00;A;A;:::;A) 6= A￿;
we have F(A00;:::;A00;A0;A;:::;A) 6= A￿ (see Lemma 1). So F(A00;:::;A00;A0;A;:::;A) 2
fA;A0g. As F(A00;:::;A00;A0;A;:::;A) 6= A; we have F(A00;:::;A00;A0;A;:::;A) = A0, al-
though here j is the only person to vote A0. To show that j is a dictator for A0; consider
any pro￿le (A1;:::;Aj￿1;A0;Aj+1;:::;An) in which j votes A0: The one-by-one substitution in
(A00;:::;A00;A0;A;:::;A) of the votes of persons i 6= j by their respective votes in (A1;:::;Aj￿1;
A0;Aj+1;:::;An) leaves the outcome at A0, by (JM) if Ai = A0 and by Lemma 1 if Ai 6= A0:
So F(A1;:::;Aj￿1;A0;Aj+1;:::;An) = A0:
3. There is a dictator. Repeating this argument with di⁄erent triples A;A0;A00 2 A shows
that there is a dictator for every judgment set A0 2 A: But these dictators for particular
8judgment sets must all be the same person (consider pro￿les in which di⁄erent judgment sets
are voted by their respective dictators), who is hence a dictator simpliciter. ￿
Theorem 1 also implies an impossibility result for independence (IX). The reason is
that (IX) implies (I e X) if the agenda X is atomic, i.e. if each consistent proposition in X is
equivalent to a disjunction of atoms of X; here, an atom (of X) (not an "atomic proposition")
is a maximally consistent member p of X; i.e. p is consistent and, for every q 2 X, p ￿ q or
p ￿ :q. Equivalently, X is atomic if its set of atoms is exhaustive, i.e., for every truth-value
assignment, X contains at least one true atom. Basic logic yields examples of atomic agendas
X (where I denote by X0 the set of atomic propositions occurring in proposition(s) in X):
(a) agendas X with ￿nite X0 for which p;q 2 X implies p^q 2 X (or for which p;q 2 X
implies p _ q 2 X; or for which p;q 2 X implies p ! q 2 X);
(b) agendas X with ￿nite X0 and identical to their scope (X = X);
(c) agendas X = fp;￿ p : p 2 Y g; where Y consists of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
propositions, e.g. Y = fa ^ b;:a ^ b;a ^ :b;:a ^ :bg:
Corollary 2 If X is atomic and contains at least two propositions (not in trivial depend-
ence), then an aggregation rule F is independent and weakly responsive (and satis￿es uni-
versal domain and collective rationality) if and only if F is dictatorial.
Proof. Let X be atomic. I have to show that (IX) implies (I e X). This holds if every state
of the world q 2 e X is logically equivalent to some atom r of X: Consider any q = ^p2Ap 2 e X
(A 2 A). Let B be the set of all atoms of X consistent with q: B is non-empty, since
otherwise q ￿ :r for all atoms r; and there would be a truth-value assignment (namely
one that makes q true) making all atoms false. Let r 2 B: I show that r is equivalent to
q: A does not contain :r (by consistency with r), hence contains r (by completeness). So
q = ^p2Ap ￿ r: Also, r ￿ q: Otherwise r would be consistent with :q; hence with :p for some
p 2 A; so that r ￿ :p for this p (since q is an atom), and hence p ￿ :r; in contradiction with
^p2Ap ￿ r: ￿
So, coming from a somewhat di⁄erent angle, Corollary 2 is an analogous result to Pauly
and van Hees￿[9] Theorem 3, except that their agenda is not assumed atomic but atomically
closed, i.e. (i) if p 2 X and a is an atomic proposition occurring in p then a 2 X, and (ii)
if p;q 2 X are two literals (i.e. possibly negated atomic propositions) then p ^ q 2 X. (I
drop their third condition, "if a 2 X is atomic then :a 2 X", since I already assume X to
contain proposition-negation pairs.) Let me combine both results in a single more general
impossibility theorem. I call an agenda X rich if it is atomically closed or atomic, and
contains at least two propositions (not in trivial dependence).
Theorem 2 For a rich agenda X, an aggregation rule F is independent and weakly respons-
ive (and satis￿es universal domain and collective rationality) if and only if F is dictatorial.
Incidentally, Theorems 1 and 2 have an interesting corollary on how independence (IX)
and independence on states of the world (I e X) are logically related ￿of which I otherwise
have little intuition except that both are of course weaker than strong independence (IX).
Corollary 3 If (U) and (C) hold, (I e X) implies (IX) and both are equivalent for rich X.
9Proof. Let X contain at least two propositions not in trivial dependence (otherwise the
claim is trivial since both (I e X) and (IX) hold). If F satis￿es (I e X), by Theorem 1 F is
dictatorial or not weakly responsive, hence satis￿es (IX). Conversely, if F satis￿es (IX) and
X is rich, by Theorem 2 F is dictatorial or not weakly responsive, hence satis￿es (I e X). ￿
6 A possibility theorem on premise-based decision-making
Despite their merits in preventing manipulation, there are good reasons to reject the inde-
pendence conditions (IX)/(I e X)/(IX). For they undermine premise-based reasoning on the
collective level, i.e. the ￿collectivization of reason￿(Pettit [10]). For instance, (IX) prevents
the collective from accepting b because it accepts the premises a and a ! b, and from ac-
cepting c because it accepts the premises a; b; and c $ (a&b) (all propositions in X). I
therefore suggest imposing instead independence on premises, which allows judgments about
"conclusions" to be derived from judgments about "premises".
The so-called premise-based procedure is usually de￿ned only in the context of the dis-
cursive dilemma or doctrinal paradox (e.g. Pettit [10]). To generalise this procedure, suppose
there is a set P ￿ X of propositions considered as premises, where P consists of proposition-
negation pairs, i.e. p 2 P implies ￿ p 2 P: (P is related to Osherson￿ s "basis".8)
De￿nition 3 The "premise-based procedure (for set of premises P)" is the aggregation rule
F with universal domain such that, for each (A1;:::;An) 2 An, F(A1;:::;An) = fp 2 X :
P￿ ￿ pg; where P￿ := fp 2 P : np > n￿p, or [np = n￿p and p is a negated proposition]g with
np denoting the number of persons i with p 2 Ai:
So the premise-based procedure ￿rst votes on premises, and then forms the deductive
closure in X. To break potential ties in the case of even group size n; by convention :q
wins over q whenever there is a tie between q;:q 2 P. (List￿ s [6] priority-to-the-past rule is
another generalisation of the premise-based procedure.)
I now prove, in short, that premise-based decision-making is possible if the system of
premises is logically independent. Consider the following conditions (where Y ￿ X).
Anonymity (A). For every two pro￿les (A1;:::;An);(A￿(1);:::;A￿(n)) 2 Dom(F); where ￿ :
f1;:::;ng ! f1;:::;ng is any permutation of the individuals, F(A1;:::;An) = F(A￿(1);:::;A￿(n)).
Monotonicity on Y (MY ). For each proposition p 2 Y , individual i and i-variants
(A1;:::;An);(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2 Dom(F) with Ai 2 p and A￿
i ￿ p, if F(A1;:::;An) ￿ p
then F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) ￿ p.
Systematicity on Y (SY ). For every two propositions p;p0 2 Y and every two pro￿les
(A1;:::;An);(A0
1;:::;A0
n) 2 Dom(F), if [for every person i, Ai ￿ p if and only if A0
i ￿ p0], then
[F(A1;:::;An) ￿ p if and only if F(A0
1;:::;A0
n) ￿ p0].
(SY ) generalises List and Pettit￿ s [7] systematicity, and implies (IY ) (take p = p0). It
requires not only propositionwise aggregation on Y (like (IY )) but also the use of the same
decision method for each p 2 Y . More precisely, one easily proves the following:
8D. Osherson, Notes on Aggregating Belief, unpublished paper, Princeton University, 2004.
10Proposition 2 Let Y ￿ X. F is systematic on Y (SY ) if and only if F applies an identical
decision method M for each proposition p 2 Y .
De￿nition 4 Condition (IP)/(SP)/(MP) is called "independence/systematicity/monotonicity
on premises". The system of premises P is "(logically) independent" if every subset A ￿ P
that contains exactly one member of each pair p;:p 2 P is consistent. The "scope of P" is
the set P of all propositions p 2 L settled by any A ￿ P that is consistent and complete in
P (i.e. P contains a member of each pair p;:p 2 P).
For instance, P is independent if it consists of atomic propositions (and their negations).
Theorem 3 Assume the system of premises P is logically independent. Then
(i) the premise-based procedure generates consistent judgment sets;
(ii) if X ￿ P (so X = P), the premise-based procedure satis￿es collective rationality,
and if also n is odd it is the only aggregation rule that is systematic on premises, monotonic
on premises and anonymous and satis￿es universal domain and collective rationality.
Here, "X ￿ P" means that the premises do not underdetermine the judgments to be
made. If X is the agenda of the discursive dilemma, fa;b;c;c $ (a ^ b);negationsg, then
P := fa;b;c $ (a^b);negationsg not only is logically independent, but also satis￿es X ￿ P:
Proof. Assume P is logically independent, and let F be the premise-based procedure.
(i) For each (A1;:::;An) 2 An; the set P￿ ￿ P (see De￿nition 3) is consistent since P￿
contains exactly one member of each pair p;:p 2 P and P is logically independent. Hence
F(A1;:::;An) = fp 2 X : P￿ ￿ pg is consistent.
(ii) Assume X ￿ P: For each (A1;:::;An) 2 An; the set P￿ ￿ P is consistent and complete
in P, as seen in (i). So, as X ￿ P; P￿ settles each p 2 X. Hence F(A1;:::;An) = fp 2 X :
P￿ ￿ pg is consistent and complete. So F satis￿es (C). Now let n be odd. F satis￿es (SP)
(as n is odd), (MP), (A), (U) and (C). Conversely, assume F￿ satis￿es all these conditions. I
show that F￿ = F. By (SP) and Proposition 2; F￿ applies some identical decision method M
for each premise p 2 P: By (A), M(t1;:::;tn) depends only on the number of persons i with
ti = 1; i.e. there exists a function g : f0;:::;ng ! f0;1g such that, for all (A1;:::;An) 2 An
and p 2 P; [p 2 F￿(A1;:::;An) if and only if g(jNpj) = 1], where Np := fi : p 2 Aig: By
(MP) and (U), g(k) ￿ g(k + 1) for all k 2 f0;:::;n ￿ 1g: Hence, by induction, (a) k < l
implies g(k) ￿ g(l); for all k;l 2 f0;:::;ng: As by (C) exactly one of each pair p;:p 2 P is
collectively accepted, we have g(jNpj) + g(jN:pj) = 1 for all (A1;:::;An) 2 An, and so (b)
g(k) + g(n ￿ k) = 1 for all k 2 f0;:::;ng: For, as (A1;:::;An) runs through An, jNpj runs
through f0;:::;ng and always takes the value n ￿ jNpj. Of course, the only solution of (a)
and (b) (for odd n) is given by g(k) = 0 for 0 ￿ k < n=2 and g(k) = 1 for n=2 < k ￿ n. So
F￿ applies, like F; propositionwise majority voting for each premise p 2 P. Hence, for all
(A1;:::;An) 2 An; F￿(A1;:::;An) \ P = F(A1;:::;An) \ P =: A￿. As F￿ satis￿es collective
rationality, A￿ is consistent and complete in P. So, by X ￿ P; A￿ settles each p 2 X: Hence,
again by collective rationality of F￿; F￿(A1;:::;An) = fp 2 X : A￿ ￿ pg; and so F￿ = F: ￿
117 Brief summary
Independence conditions are crucial to protect against manipulation both by agenda set-
ters and by voters. In particular, independence on states of the world protects against
logical agenda manipulation, strong independence protects against general agenda manipu-
lation, and independence on Y (￿ X) together with monotonicity on Y guarantees strategy-
proofness on Y: However, di⁄erent impossibility theorems establish that these independence
conditions cannot be ful￿lled together with the minimal conditions of weak responsiveness
and non-dictatorship (and universal domain and collective rationality). Unlike earlier im-
possibility theorems by List and Pettit and by Pauly and van Hees, my main impossibility
result is valid for any agenda (with at least two propositions not in trivial dependence).
However, even ignoring impossibility results, independence requirements are inherently
problematic as they undermine premise-driven collective judgment formation. I therefore
suggested imposing merely independence on premises. This allows for the premise-based
procedure, which was shown to generate consistent collective judgment sets provided that
the system of premises is logically independent. This leaves open the practically important
question of how to determine a system of premises ￿one of many future challenges.
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